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Abstract The COVID-19 crisis has had enormous costs. The effects on financial mar-
kets were exacerbated by panic, fear of the unknown, fear of the end of the world as we 
knew it. This panic obfuscated our ability to make rational predictions on future cash 
flows and asset values. Overall though, our economic system is bouncing back. We can 
learn from this experience and build more flexible models which can help us to better 
manage severe systemic risks.
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Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 The Perfect Storm: Panic and Uncertainty. – 3 The Timeline 
of the COVID-19 Pandemic. – 4 The Effects of the COVID-19 Crisis on Equity Markets. – 
5 Industry Groups. – 6 The Prediction of Financial Models (CAPM Beta). – 7Conclusions.
1 Introduction
This crisis has had huge costs in terms of human lives lost, great physical and 
psychological suffering caused either directly by the disease or indirectly by 
the drastic measures adopted to contain the spread of the virus. This pan-
demic will have enduring consequences on the world population, the econo-
my, our societies, the environment, and the financial systems. Notwithstand-
ing the enormity of the physical and psychological pain caused by the virus, 
in this chapter 1 only reflect on the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the 
equity markets. Financial markets, more generally, provide an essential price 
discovery function. They aggregate demand and supply for assets and prod-
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ucts and help us discover the value of these assets and products so 
that we can properly allocate resources to particular projects, sec-
tors/industries and enterprises.
2 The Perfect Storm: Panic and Uncertainty
To assess the level of panic in the equity markets due to the COV-
ID-19 pandemic we can refer to two major volatility indices: the VIX 
(CBOE Volatilty Index) in the US and the Vstoxx (Euro Stoxx 50 Vol-
atility Index) in Europe. These are the indices for the level of volatil-
ity implied from option contracts on major equity indices, the S&P 
500 and the Euro Stoxx 50 in the US and Europe, respectively. The 
VIX and the Vstoxx are often referred to as fear gauges capturing 
the level of uncertainty in financial markets. Over the last 20 years, 
these indices had two major peaks which reflect episodes of extreme-
ly high levels of uncertainty in the financial markets. The first peak 
was in October 2008 during the credit crisis, and the second was in 
March 2020 when the Western world went into lockdown. 
In mid-March 2020, the announcement of drastic restrictive meas-
ures by US authorities precipitated the crisis. Market participants re-
alised that the COVID-19 pandemic was not going to be confined to 
Asia. It had already started showing the first signs of potentially dev-
astating effects on Western economies and the lockdown increased 
the likelihood of the most catastrophic scenarios. As the graphs in 
figure 1 show, the US markets became even more fearful of the ef-
fects of the pandemic on equity values than what they were at the 
time of the credit crisis [fig. 1]. Perhaps this is because the pandem-
ic severely affected New York, the main US financial centre. In Eu-
rope instead, financial markets reflected a relatively greater level of 
uncertainty during the financial crises. The pandemic created hav-
oc in Italy and Spain sparing, at first, Europe’s main financial cen-
tres such as London, Frankfurt, and Paris. With so much fear and un-
certainty markets do not function well in discovering asset prices.
3 The Timeline of the COVID-19 Pandemic
So, how and when did it all begin? A new mysterious virus was first re-
ported by Chinese authorities to the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
on December 31, 2019, although now scientists believe the virus was 
already circulating in China since November 2019. Despite the dras-
tic containment measures taken by the Chinese authorities to try to 
limit the contagion, unfortunately the virus spread to other countries 
in South East Asia. The virus was showing unexpected strength and 
high infection rates which could yield high mortality rates. By the end 
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Figure 1 The volatility indices. This figure presents the time series for the daily values of the VIX 
and the VSTOXX indices from 29 May 2000 to 30 May 2020. The data were downloaded 
from the Thompson Reuters Eikon platform
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of January, the virus had spread to 18 countries outside China. On Jan-
uary 30, 2020, the WHO officially declared the status of Internation-
al Health Emergency. This declaration triggered a series of health 
procedures and travel restrictions across the world. On February 11, 
2020, the WHO named the new coronavirus as COVID-19. On March 
11, 2020, the WHO declared the outbreak of a global pandemic.1
The first western country to enter into a national lockdown was It-
aly on March 10, 2020. On March 13, 2020, President Trump declared 
a national emergency initiating a series of government response pro-
cedures.2 In the following days, a number of other European coun-
tries adopted restrictive measures and on March 23, 2020 the UK 
also entered into a national lockdown.3 In the US, the first “stay at 
home” order was issued by California on March 19, 2020.4 Although 
a US-wide lockdown was never implemented, most states adopted re-
strictive measures.5 
4 The Effects of the COVID-19 Crisis on Equity Markets
The Italian, UK and US stock markets started a rapid decline on Feb-
ruary 20, 2020 when the new virus was rapidly spreading across Eu-
rope and the US [fig. 2]. The Italian equity market suffered the steep-
est fall and reached the lowest level on March 12, 2020 [fig. 3]. In less 
than a month, the Italian equity market fell by more than 41%. It took 
a bit longer for the US and the UK markets to reach their lowest lev-
el. This came on the March 23 when the FTSE 100 Index closed down 
by almost 200 points for the day.
1 The timeline of the pandemic is based on a report by the World Health Organisa-
tion detailing its response to the COVID-19 crisis. The report is available at https://
www.who.int/news-room/detail/29-06-2020-covidtimeline.
2 See for example, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/13/politics/states-coro-
navirus-fema/index.html.
3 On March 9, 2020, the Italian prime minister Giuseppe Conte signed a decree for 
the implementation of a national lockdown starting from March 10, 2020. Detailed in-
formation on the measures implemented by governments in response to the pandemic 
is provided by Oxford University’s COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, which is 
available at https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/covidtracker.
4 See the Executive Order N-33-20 issued by California at https://www.gov.ca.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2020/03/3.19.20-attested-EO-N-33-20-COVID-19-HEALTH-OR-
DER.pdf.
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Figure 2 The scale for the S&P 500 Index is indicated on the left-hand side and the scale for the FTSE 100 index 
is indicated on the right-hand side. The sample covers the period from September 3, 2019 to June 25, 2020. The 
data was downloaded from the Thompson Reuters Eikon platform
Figure 3 The scale for the FTSE 100 Index is indicated on the left-hand side and the scale for the FTSE MIB 
index is indicated on the right-hand side. The sample covers the period from September 3, 2019 to June 25, 
2020. The data was downloaded from the Thompson Reuters Eikon platform
Over the period from February 19 to March 23, 2020, the UK FTSE 
100 index lost about 33% and the S&P 500 index about 34% of their 
values, respectively. The worst daily price change for the UK equi-
ty market was recorded on March 12 when the FTSE 100 Index lost 
10.87% in a single day. This is the largest single-day drop recorded 
over the last 20 years (since May 30, 2000). Table 1 shows the dis-
tinct phases of the COVID-19 crisis so far and summarises the chang-
es in the values of the benchmark Italian, UK and US equity indices.
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Italy Feb 19 -
Mar 12, 2020
-41.54 Mar 12 -
Jun 8, 2020
30.02 Feb 19 -
Jun 8, 2020
-20.59
UK Feb 19 -
Mar 23, 2020
-33.03 Mar 23 -
Jun 8, 2020
29.61 Feb 19 -
Jun 8, 2020
-13.20
USA Feb 19 - 
Mar 23,  2020
-33.92 Mar 23 -
Jun 8, 2020
44.47 Feb 19 -
Jun 8, 2020
-4.54
The equity indices used for Italy, UK and USA are FTSE MIB, FTSE 100 and S&P 500, 
respectively. Returns were computed using daily data which was downloaded from 
the Thompson Reuters Eikon platform.
5 Industry Groups
The performance of the various industry groups during the decline 
and recovery phases of the crisis is summarised in tables 2 and 3 be-
low. The industry returns are value-weighted and thus they will be 
driven by the performance of the largest companies in each sector. 
In the UK, the transportation industry was the most affected (-63%). 
With the lockdown in place, aeroplanes were grounded, international 
travel stopped almost completely, and most people were housebound. 
More surprisingly, the media and entertainment industry (WPP, Pear-
son, etc.) was the second worst performing industry during the de-
cline phase. With many businesses halted by health and safety re-
strictions, advertising budgets froze, and fairs and exhibitions were 
cancelled; this hit the UK media industry, which relies almost exclu-
sively on ad revenue. However, in the US the increased demand for 
news and home entertainment helped online American media com-
panies (Google, Facebook, Walt Disney, etc.) to recover more rapid-
ly than other industries. 
Industries providing core and essential services or those that were 
able to adapt quickly to flexible/distance working conditions suffered 
lower declines and recovered very quickly (for example, e-commerce, 
technology, software services). In the US, the retailing (Amazon, 
Ebay, Dollar General) and technology industries managed to weath-
er the COVID-19 storm better than other industries posting double 
digit increases in aggregate industry values. 
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Table 2 The performance of the FTSE 100 index components by industry groups 
over the COVID-19 crisis from December 2019 to June 2020
Decline Recovery Overall
FTSE 100 - Industry Groups 1 Jan 
-27 Mar 20 (%)
Rank 27 Mar 
-26 Jun 20 (%)
Rank 27 Dec 19 
-26 Jun 20 (%)
Rank
Banks (5) -28.11% 16 -16.74% 22 -40.86% 20
Capital Goods (9) -24.95% 14 9.81% 9 -19.16% 12
Commercial & Professional 
Services (5)
-8.05% 4 10.89% 8 0.72% 5
Consumer Durables & Apparel (5) -30.55% 18 9.11% 10 -24.02% 17
Consumer Services (5) -30.87% 19 5.08% 15 -28.00% 18
Diversified Financials (8) -20.28% 10 11.65% 7 -11.47% 10
Energy (3) -35.76% 20 -7.16% 21 -41.59% 21
Food & Staples Retailing (3) -8.83% 5 -1.60% 19 -10.23% 9
Food, Beverage & Tobacco (5) -18.77% 7 6.59% 13 -14.05% 11
Health Care Equipment & 
Services (1)
-23.47% 12 6.13% 14 -20.82% 13
Household & Personal Products (2) -6.15% 2 13.56% 6 5.63% 2
Insurance (6) -24.54% 13 3.07% 16 -22.50% 15
Materials (14) -25.54% 15 23.04% 2 -8.78% 8
Media & Entertainment (6) -38.76% 21 6.75% 12 -35.42% 19
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology 
& Life Sciences (3)
-12.26% 6 16.83% 4 0.74% 4
Real Estate (3) -28.81% 17 7.35% 11 -22.27% 14
Retailing (5) -19.49% 8 31.95% 1 7.00% 1
Software & Services (3) -19.53% 9 17.07% 3 -7.06% 7
Technology Hardware  
& Equipment (1)
-6.76% 3 14.65% 5 5.50% 3
Telecommunication Services (2) -21.00% 11 -0.92% 18 -23.47% 16
Transportation (1) -62.96% 22 -1.90% 20 -63.72% 22
Utilities (5) -1.92% 1 2.46% 17 -0.78% 6
The table presents cumulative returns for the various industry groups. These are 
percentage changes in the aggregate value (market capitalisation) of each industry 
group. The lowest rank is given to the best performing industry group during each 
phase. The best 5 performing industries are coloured in green and the worst 5 in red. 
The data was downloaded from the Thompson Reuters Eikon platform.
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Table 4 The performance of the S&P 500 index components by industry groups 
over the COVID-19 crisis from December 2019 to June 2020
Decline Recovery Overall
S&P 500 - Industry Groups 1 Jan 20 
-27 Mar 20 (%)
Rank 27 Mar 
-26 Jun 20 (%)
Rank 27 Dec 19 
-26 Jun 20 (%)
Rank
Automobiles & Components (4) -40.92% 23 19.74% 8 -29.66% 22
Banks (18) -36.59% 22 4.43% 23 -34.05% 23
Capital Goods (48) -25.28% 18 8.63% 18 -19.33% 20
Commercial & Professional 
Services (10)
-16.69% 12 16.55% 10 -2.54% 7
Consumer Durables & Apparel 
(18)
-27.58% 19 17.97% 9 -14.38% 17
Consumer Services (15) -31.48% 21 8.29% 19 -26.14% 21
Diversified Financials (26) -21.56% 15 10.47% 15 -13.64% 16
Energy (26) -48.69% 24 22.92% 5 -37.03% 24
Food & Staples Retailing (5) -9.27% 3 6.07% 21 -4.19% 9
Food, Beverage & Tobacco (21) -17.37% 13 7.96% 20 -10.68% 14
Health Care Equipment & 
Services (38)
-16.68% 11 13.76% 12 -5.39% 10
Household & Personal Products (7) -12.57% 6 10.81% 14 -3.19% 8
Insurance (22) -28.04% 20 12.01% 13 -19.09% 19
Materials (28) -25.13% 17 20.32% 7 -9.83% 12
Media & Entertainment (22) -15.69% 10 24.63% 3 3.64% 5
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology 
& Life Sciences (24)
-12.36% 5 14.57% 11 0.04% 6
Real Estate (31) -19.15% 14 9.89% 17 -10.38% 13
Retailing (24) -7.63% 2 34.48% 1 23.31% 1
Semiconductors & 
Semiconductor Equipment (16)
-12.03% 4 22.04% 6 6.62% 4
Software & Services (35) -7.08% 1 23.14% 4 13.73% 3
Technology Hardware & 
Equipment (20)
-14.27% 9 32.43% 2 14.56% 2
Telecommunication Services (4) -13.90% 7 5.28% 22 -9.18% 11
Transportation (15) -23.11% 16 10.26% 16 -15.92% 18
Utilities (28) -14.25% 8 0.64% 24 -13.07% 15
The table presents cumulative returns for the various industry groups. These are 
percentage changes in the aggregate value (market capitalisation) of each industry 
group. The lowest rank is given to the best performing industry group during each 
phase. The best 5 performing industries are coloured in green and the worst 5 in red. 
The data was downloaded from the Thompson Reuters Eikon platform.
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The share prices of US and European banks have been falling signif-
icantly since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis as investors have 
been fearing that the disruption to business caused by the lockdown 
may increase default rates on bank loans, while continuing monetary 
stimulus may keep interest rates low, thus hurting banks’ margins 
and profitability. In addition, regulators have urged banks to freeze 
dividend payments to shareholders and strengthen their core capi-
tal so that they would be able to absorb larger than expected losses 
in their loan portfolios.
Another industry hit hard by the pandemic has been the energy 
industry. The travel restrictions and the lockdown created a sharp 
fall in the demand for oil. Such a deep and sudden negative demand 
shock combined with a relatively sticky supply created the perfect 
storm with devastating effects on oil prices. The negative pressure on 
oil prices was amplified by the delays in finding an agreement among 
oil-producing countries on the appropriate, joint response to dwin-
dling energy demand. Thus, the excess oil supply led to increases in 
oil inventories and a sharp fall in oil prices. All available storage was 
full and sellers had to pay buyers to take oil off their hands. Oil was 
cheap but the cost of storage had surged. On Monday April 20, 2020, 
the light crude oil contract trading on the New York Mercantile ex-
change reached a minimum of about negative $40 per barrel. This cre-
ated a problem. Traditionally, financial models assume that asset pric-
es do not go below the zero level. Thus, how do we price an asset with 
negative prices? Financial markets had to scramble and implement 
ad-hoc models to allow commodity prices to reach negative values.6 
6 The Prediction of Financial Models (CAPM Beta)
Usually, our financial models would suggest taking refuge in defen-
sive stocks during downturns and then shifting to more aggressive 
stocks during the rebound. Stocks would be classified using the be-
ta coefficient of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) which in-
dicates how correlated and sensitive a particular stock is to move-
ments in the whole financial market. Low beta stocks (with beta less 
than 1) are often called defensive stocks. They have more stable per-
formance and relatively lower volatility. Whereas, high beta stocks 
(with beta greater than 1) are called aggressive stocks. These are 
riskier but can potentially deliver higher returns. How did so-called 
6 See the note released by the CME on April 8, 2020 at https://www.cmegroup.com/
content/dam/cmegroup/notices/clearing/2020/04/Chadv20-152.pdf. Eventually, 
on 22 April 2020, CME Clearing adopted the Bachelier Option Pricing Model (https://
www.cmegroup.com/notices/clearing/2020/04/Chadv20-171.html).
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defensive stocks perform during the declining phase of the pandem-
ic? Did the market behave as expected supporting financial theories 
or instead provided further evidence of the limitations of existing fi-
nancial models and thus calling for new theories to be developed? 
I used industry CAPM beta coefficients computed by Aswath Da-
modaran in January 2020 for US stocks and related them to cumula-
tive stock returns during the two main phases of the COVID-19 pan-
demic.7 Figure 4 shows scatter plots relating cumulative returns for 
the stocks included in the S&P 500 index with their industry beta 
during the decline and recovery phases of the COVID-19 pandemic 
[fig. 4]. The scatter plots also show the trend line which summaris-
es the relationships between cumulative returns and CAPM betas. 
The CAPM model worked very well during the recovery phase 
when high beta stocks clearly bounced back more rapidly than low 
beta stocks posting high cumulative returns. This evidence seems 
consistent with the more rigorous work conducted by Savor and Wil-
son (2014) which shows how on days with macroeconomic announce-
ments there is a strong positive relation between average returns and 
stock betas as predicted by the CAPM model. On other days though, 
the same relationship does not hold. Hence, our financial models 
seem to work well during the recovery phase of the crisis as well as 
on announcement days because, as Savor and Wilson (2014) note, in 
these days there is “a clear link between macroeconomic risk and as-
set returns”. When traders are driven by panic and fear instead, our 
traditional models based on long-term expectations and rational be-
haviour break down. The return-risk relationship observed during 
the decline phase is almost flat. Thus, the intuition of investing in de-
fensive stocks might have just marginally limited investment losses. 
This preliminary evidence seems to support Lopez de Prado (2019)’s 
call for the development of more flexible models which are optimal 
under different regimes and market conditions. 
7 The CAPM beta data is available at http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/New_
Home_Page/datacurrent.html. The cumulative returns were computed using data 
downloaded from the Thompson Reuters Eikon platform.
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Figure 4 Cumulative stock returns (%) versus CAPM industry beta coefficients 
for the S&P 500 Index stock components. A dotted trend line is shown. Cumulative 
returns were computed using stock data downloaded from the Thompson 
Reuters Eikon platform. The CAPM industry beta coefficients were estimated 
by Aswath Damodaran for January 2020
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7 Conclusions
This pandemic has destabilised our financial markets and severely af-
fected our economies. Governments have now committed enormous 
resources to help the economy recover. Financial markets and finan-
cial infrastructures will have to play their part. It is time to start re-
flecting on the lessons from the pandemic. We are now in a world with 
potentially negative prices and with negative interest rates. We are 
very interconnected and therefore vulnerable to factors which may 
lead to systemic crises (credit and liquidity shortages, pandemics, 
cybersecurity attacks, etc.). Given the extreme scenarios created by 
the pandemic, it is important to gather relevant data and reflect on 
whether our models are still fit for purpose. If not, we should use the 
evidence to guide the development of new theories and models. These 
theories and models should help us better rationalise the effects of 
these crises on asset values and prevent reaching extreme levels of 
uncertainty which may have contributed to escalating the crisis. At 
the outburst of the pandemic, the priority of governments and regu-
lators correctly focused on adopting all measures necessary to save 
human lives. Perhaps for future pandemic scenarios we should more 
promptly implement measures to mitigate the impact of the pandem-
ic on our businesses and financial markets hence preventing reach-
ing such an extreme level of uncertainty about firm and asset values.
Clearly, we are not out of the woods yet with respect to COVID-19. 
The disease is still spreading around the world and a second wave is 
still likely if a vaccine is not developed before the next flu season. The 
economic engine of the Western world was temporarily switched off 
to “stop the virus and save the NHS” as we were saying in the UK. It 
is now the time to switch on the economic accelerator and take the op-
portunity to learn from the crisis and set the foundations for creating 
an even stronger, more resilient, and more equitable financial system.
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